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Waiting for Gundy 
How much authority—how much room to make policy choices—can 
Congress delegate to the president and executive branch? This was the 
question at the heart of Gundy v. United States, a case heard by the 
Supreme Court this past term. On its face, the case was about sex 
offender registration. In setting the registration rules going forward, 
Congress left it to the attorney general to decide the complicated 
question of how those rules should apply to those previously convicted, 
perhaps even to those who already served their sentences. After the 
attorney general decided to apply the registration rules across the board, 
a previously convicted sex offender, Herman Gundy, failed to register, 
and was then convicted of violating the statute, and sentenced. The 
question specifically before the Court was whether Congress had 
unconstitutionally delegated too much discretion, too much of its 
legislative power, to the attorney general. 
But for the Court and its close observers, the issue was much broader. 
Since the 1930s, no statute has been held to unconstitutionally delegate 
too much of Congress’ power. The Court has consistently held that as 
long as Congress includes an “intelligible principle” in a statute, meaning 
some guidance from Congress on how it wants the executive branch to 
apply the discretion it’s delegating, the delegation is valid. On that basis, 
Congress has delegated vast authority to the president, and the 
administrative agencies he or she oversees, to issue rules designed to 
protect our air and water from toxic emissions, to guarantee product 
safety, to set labor standards, to decide what drugs are safe for use, to 
monitor food safety, and much, much more. The entire modern 
regulatory state is built on these congressional delegations to expert 
executive branch bodies to make rules governing an increasingly 
complex world. 
Then, Gundy threw all of that into question. A decision that found 
Congress had delegated too much authority would impact, and likely 
threaten, a vast, unpredictable range of rules on subjects as varied as 
drug safety and highway regulation, health codes and environmental 
regulations. With a new line-up of justices on the Court (not including 
Justice Kavanaugh, who was not confirmed until after oral argument in 
Gundy), supporters of the regulatory state watched in trepidation; while 
opponents watched with hope. 
But, another more specific group was also watching Gundy with 
anticipation. Among the vast array of congressional delegations to the 
executive branch is Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, a 
statute granting the president authority to issue tariffs on imports he or 
she finds threaten national security. It was under that statute that 
President Donald Trump had issued controversial high tariffs on 
aluminum and steel imports from a range of countries, including allies 
like Canada. Challenging those tariffs, lawyers representing the 
American Institute for International Steel argued that the delegation in 
section 232 was unconstitutionally broad. If threats to national security 
could include steel and aluminum imports from allies, the concept has 
no rational bounds, they argued. A lower court found against the 
plaintiffs on the basis of precedent, but expressed sympathy for their 
position. The case was awaiting a decision on certiorari as the decision 
in Gundy was being announced. 
Those worried about the national security tariffs were thus 
watching Gundy for hints about how to challenge those trade 
delegations. And many weren’t just worried about section 232. Over the 
years, Congress has delegated vast authority to the president when he or 
she identifies a threat to national security or declares a national 
emergency. Different statutes, using different language, authorize the 
president to raise tariffs; to sanction states, institutions, and individuals; 
to redirect funds to projects Congress has not authorized; to deny certain 
individuals or groups entry into the United States; and to use military 
force. 
In the past two years alone, Trump has claimed such authority to 
unilaterally issue steel and aluminum tariffs under Section 232 and 
threaten the same on auto parts; to implement a travel ban targeting 
majority-Muslim countries under the Immigration and Naturalization 
Act (INA); to threaten Mexico with tariffs under the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) if it didn’t do more to stop 
migration to the U.S.; to find funds for a border wall that Congress 
specifically chose not to support; to continue attacks under the 2001 
Authorization of Use of Military Force (AUMF), originally passed to go 
after the perpetrators of 9/11, on militant groups in Syria and elsewhere; 
and to float the possibility under the same AUMF of war with Iran (an 
interpretation the State Department seems to have thankfully mostly 
dropped) . 
For many watching these developments, these congressional delegations, 
justified on national security grounds, seemed like a blank check. To 
address these concerns, this group would love to see national security 
delegations rolled-back or disciplined, and a revitalized non-delegation 
doctrine, which would limit the discretion Congress could delegate, 
would certainly help. Gundy, thus, set those favoring a regulatory state 
and those worried about a national security one on a collision course. A 
win for environmental regulation would be a loss for constraining 
emergency powers and vice versa. 
Heads I Win; Tails You Lose 
But if that trade-off seems strange or unfair, the reality of Gundy was 
worse—both could lose! The majority in Gundy — in a decision written 
by Justice Kagan, and joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and 
Sotomayor — delivered a seeming win for the regulatory state. Reading 
the statute narrowly, they concluded that the delegation contained an 
“intelligible principle,” and following the Court’s precedent, upheld the 
statute and Gundy’s conviction. Begrudgingly joining the majority was 
Justice Alito, who explained that he was only joining because there was 
no majority in favor of reconsidering the Court’s permissive precedent. 
The opinion Justice Alito presumably would have joined was the dissent 
authored by Justice Gorsuch and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Thomas. The dissenters, if there had been more of them, would 
have resurrected the non-delegation doctrine and found the delegation 
to the attorney general in Gundy unconstitutional. In so doing, they 
would have allowed delegations in three narrower circumstances: (1) to 
merely “fill-up the details” of a statute, (2) where the statute delegated 
only a finding-of-fact on which action under the statute might turn, and 
(3) in areas where congressional powers overlapped with those of the 
president, most notably on issues of foreign affairs and national security. 
In other words, if the dissenters had their way—which, with Justices 
Kavanaugh and Alito’s votes they might have—much of the 
administrative state could be declared unconstitutional and dismantled, 
while the expansive delegations to the president on national security 
would remain untouched. 
As expected, those who support the work of administrative agencies, like 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), were relieved by the majority’s opinion, but 
anxious at the possibility of a future majority in favor of the 
dissent. Supporters of the tariff case, and the potential it held for 
constraining national security delegations, were disappointed, a sense 
confirmed when certiorari before judgment was denied four days later. 
No Way Out 
The two main Gundy opinions thus highlight the imbalanced stakes of 
current constitutional non-delegation doctrine. Those worried about 
unchecked presidential authority over national security can’t argue 
against the breadth of congressional delegations without threatening the 
entire administrative state. “National security” or “emergency” or 
“threat” may be very broad principles to work with, but they aren’t 
obviously any broader than terms like “fair” or “reasonable” used in 
other statutes.  But taking that risk hardly promises success. While those 
worried about executive national security authority can’t argue that 
national security delegations are more constitutionally suspect than 
others; those supporting national security delegations (or opposing the 
regulatory state) can argue that are they less. 
The only existing constitutional principle to distinguish between national 
security and other delegations works only to strengthen the standing of 
the former. The principle, that foreign affairs and national security are 
different, was most famously articulated in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright, a decision cited by the dissenters in Gundy and which was 
notably decided by the same justices who invalidated New Deal 
legislation on non-delegation grounds—the last justices to do so. Support 
on the Court for a strong non-delegation doctrine has long been 
connected with support for a powerful national security president. 
There was a time, not that long ago, when it looked like the Court might 
be moving away from that dynamic. In contexts other than delegation, 
various justices across the ideological spectrum had 
expressed skepticism of executive branch claims to special foreign affairs 
or national security deference. Chief Justice Roberts, for example, 
rejected the president’s claims to special authority in Medellín (to order 
Texas to comply with an international judgment) and Bond (to interpret 
the Chemical Weapons Convention) and would have rejected the 
president’s claims to exclusive authority to issue statements about 
Jerusalem’s status in Zivotofsky v. Kerry. Given these signals, some 
wondered if Curtiss-Wright was still good law or still had any force. 
But the Gundy opinions suggest that an old equilibrium has returned. 
The more conservative justices, aligned with the dissent, favor 
disciplining the administrative state but not the national security 
president. Just last term, writing for a conservative majority to uphold 
the travel ban in Trump v. Hawaii, Chief Justice Roberts, wrote that the 
“comprehensive” delegations to the president in the INA to exclude 
aliens “exuded deference.” This term, Roberts joined the Gundy dissent, 
along with other justices in the Trump v. Hawaii majority. 
Facing them on the other side of the Court are justices who *might* be 
more concerned about the dangers of unchecked presidential national 
security powers. Their prior decisions, upholding deference in Zivotofsky 
v. Kerry, for example, suggest that concern is far from categorical and 
that they too may be prone to blink when national security might be on 
the line. What seems much more categorical is their faith in the 
administrative state and defense of the intelligible principle doctrine. 
Some might argue that worrying about some delegations while favoring 
others is exactly as it should be. You take the good with the bad. 
Recognizing that delegation grants the president authority you want him 
or her to have and authority you’d rather he or she didn’t, might act as a 
discipline, tempering enthusiasm for the administrative state and 
preaching congressional restraint. But it doesn’t. Expansive delegations 
on all subjects are the norm. And to the extent it does give some pause to 
those who favor the regulatory state but worry about national security 
discretion, it worries only them. Their mirror image, those who favor 
broad executive discretion on national security issues but despise the 
administrative state, aren’t forced to accept any trade-offs. They can have 
their cake and eat it too. Existing doctrine gives them a ready-made way 
to distinguish national security delegations from other questions, but 
one that only works in their favor. 
Cutting the Gundy-ian Knot 
So where does that leave those who are concerned about undisciplined 
presidential actions in the name of national security or emergencies? Is 
an unwanted trade war with Canada, Japan, and the European Union, 
simply the cost of safe drugs? Congress seems the obvious route to avoid 
that trade-off. These are delegations; Congress could take the powers 
back. Putting aside the fact that after Zivotofsky v. Kerry, some justices 
might allow broad executive discretion even in the absence of any 
statutory authority (or contrary to statutory discipline), any 
congressional attempt to wrest these powers back would likely need to 
overcome a presidential veto, and thus require a congressional 
supermajority. Expecting Congress to muster that on questions of 
foreign policy that members might prefer not to own, seems vaguely 
delusional. Or to put it another way, imagine what a president would 
need to do in order to muster such a supermajority against him or her. 
Whatever you’re now picturing, I imagine you’d rather not wait to see it 
happen. 
So while lobbying Congress seems imperative, a path through the courts 
cannot simply be renounced. The focus might turn, as it already has, to 
the specifics of particular cases, arguing not against the underlying 
delegation but its use. In any given case, those concerned might argue 
that terms like national security or emergency have been abused. They 
might point to the process behind the action and argue bad faith. They 
might propose a narrower reading of the statute (with a whiff of 
constitutional avoidance) that the president’s actions fail. Each claim 
would face an uphill battle, but would at least hold out hope that a 
majority of justices, liberated from focusing on the broader delegation 
question, might coalesce. Alternatively, those concerned might try to 
minimize the national security or foreign affairs aspects of a statute, 
arguing that whatever the statute’s language, the powers it invoked are 
really Congress’s alone. Or as Just Security’s Kristen Eichensehr has 
argued, it might mean providing less deference to the president under a 
version of the Youngstown analysis when a majority of Congress has 
voted their disapproval. 
But the holy grail for those concerned about unbridled presidential 
national security, foreign relations, or emergency powers remains a 
principle that can explain why delegations in those categories are MORE 
concerning than ordinary domestic ones. Some arguments are out there: 
One might argue, for example, that national security, foreign relations, 
and emergency delegations are different because they tend to externalize 
their costs onto non-citizens who cannot fully access the American 
political process. But that argument is more attractive to scholars than 
courts, and anyway, is met by the doctrinal counterargument that the 
president is the constitutional actor best situated to assess foreign 
opinions. In general, a principle likely to convince the Court remains 
elusive. Ironically though, Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent might 
suggest an avenue worth exploring. 
Fact-finding Fallacies 
Justice Gorsuch’s second category of acceptable delegations are those 
that involve merely presidential fact-finding. At first glance, this second 
category seems designed to protect foreign affairs and national security 
delegations as much as the third. Many such delegations are structured 
exactly that way. They allow the president to take certain actions after a 
finding of a threat to national security or emergency. But thinking more 
deeply about the fit reveals a problem with such delegations: they are 
fact-finding in name only. 
“National security,” “emergency,” and other similar triggers pretend to 
be factual scenarios that can be ascertained when they are, in fact, 
nothing of the sort. Such terms lack any stable meaning; fact-finding is 
illusory, because there is no established baseline. Such terms are not 
even normative judgments like “fair” or “reasonable.” Instead, they are 
merely empty labels to be filled, like the definitions section of a contract. 
To put it another way, fact-finding doesn’t find a national security issue, 
it constructs one. It is basically the delegation of story-telling. The fact-
finding doesn’t discipline the delegation, but instead creates and enables 
it. 
While this realization may not be a test for unconstitutional delegations, 
it might point in the direction of one, explaining what instinctively might 
worry many about the nature of delegations used to unilaterally fund 
projects, exclude aliens, start trade wars, or designate enemies. It might 
also provide guidance for future delegations, suggesting more concrete 
factual scenarios that might serve as triggers of presidential power. What 
is clear though is that until a test or principle is found, the national 
security delegation conundrum will remain. 
 
